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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the cognitive capacity I call actuality-oriented imagining. I’ll begin with two 
illustrative examples of this capacity. First, suppose you’re asked how many windows are on the 
outside of your house, a question you’ve never explicitly entertained before. The answer doesn’t 
immediately come to mind, so you pause momentarily before responding. During this pause, you 
visualize the outside of your house; you mentally rotate the house in your visual image, while counting 
the number of windows on each side. You then respond, “It has ten windows.”  
Now, suppose you’re asked whether your balding uncle has more or less than half his head of 
hair remaining, again a question you’ve never explicitly entertained before. Your uncle isn’t currently 
anywhere in the immediate vicinity, so you pause to visualize his head before answering. You mentally 
examine his head from various angles to take note of how much hair your image contains, estimating 
that he has less than half of his hair remaining. You then respond to the question accordingly.  
 Assuming you’ve had enough prior perceptual experiences of your house and of your uncle, 
this use of mental imagery seems like the natural way to go about answering these questions. While 
we often associate the imagination with our capacity to represent hypothetical or fictional states of 
affairs, cases like these make salient that we also use it to represent things as they are in the actual 
world. Such cases are my focus in this paper. More specifically, I’m focused on cases where, as in the 
above two, a subject intentionally imagines as a means of coming up with an answer to some currently 
salient question about the actual world. In such cases, one doesn’t form a mental image which merely 
happens to be of, or resemble, something actual; rather, one uses one’s imagination in a way that’s 
aimed at representing the actual. 
This paper considers two questions about actuality-oriented imagining. The first, which I’ll call 
the “content determination” question, asks how to specify the factors that determine which object(s) 
an actuality-oriented mental image represents. In other words, when I imagine some actual object (e.g., 
my house) what makes it the case that my mental image represents that object, as opposed to some 
distinct one (e.g., a fake house façade)? The second, the “success conditions” question, asks about the 
success conditions of actuality-oriented imaginings—under what conditions are such imaginative 
states of mind successful? My goal in this paper is to give partial answers to these questions, and in 
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doing so to reveal ways that actuality-oriented imagining is interestingly distinct from other, similar 
cognitive capacities. 
 In §2, I’ll first motivate the claim that we need to answer these questions in a way that’s specific 
to actuality-oriented imagining, rather than borrowing existing answers about similar capacities. 
Specifically, I’ll argue that, although actuality-oriented imagining has similarities to both perception 
and other kinds of imagining, the kinds of answers typically given for those faculties seem intuitively 
not to be applicable to actuality-oriented imagining. §3 then more concretely probes the cognitive 
structure of actuality-oriented imagining, by situating it within the “predictive processing” framework 
from cognitive science. This framework helps to bring out the fact that actuality-oriented imagining 
has both perceptual and active elements, since it’s generated using perceptual cognitive mechanisms 
but is also a particular kind of mental action. After elucidating these two aspects of actuality-oriented 
imagining, §4 will leverage this account to help fill out what makes actuality-oriented imagining 
distinctive, in terms of content determination and success conditions.  
The ultimate aim of this paper is to show that actuality-oriented imagining is a cognitive 
capacity which is philosophically interesting in its own right, warranting individualized investigation. 
In this spirit, §5 concludes by sketching two implications, for the philosophy of imagination more 
generally, of this paper’s arguments. 
2. Existing answers about similar capacities  
 This section considers the plausibility of adopting answers, to both the content determination 
and success conditions questions, that are often given to analogous questions about similar cognitive 
capacities. One such capacity I’ll consider is perception. It’s common for philosophers to compare 
imagination with perception, given their similarity of phenomenal character and underlying cognitive 
mechanisms.1 Actuality-oriented imagining, in particular, has an affinity with perception that other 
kinds of imagining don’t, given that it’s directed at representing the actual world as it is in the present. 
In addition to perception, I’ll consider answers to each question that are adopted from common views 
about imagination more generally. §2.1 will consider answers to the content determination question 
 
1 Philosophers sometimes distinguish sensory imagining, which involves mental imagery, from purely 
propositional imagining, which is something like an imaginative analogue of belief. It’s controversial 
whether there’s such a thing as purely propositional imagining (cf. Kind 2001; Balcerak Jackson 2016), 
but I’m not taking a stance on this issue. I’m concerned in this paper only with imagining that involves 
imagery, so I leave open whether there are also non-sensory imaginings. 
3 
 
from both perception and other kinds of imagination; §2.2 will consider answers to the success 
conditions question from the same. 
Each of the next two subsections starts by describing a case of attempted actuality-oriented 
imagining in which it seems intuitively that a subject mis-imagines, in different ways. The case in §2.1 
involves a kind of imaginative failure that we should expect a correct answer to the content 
determination question to explain; the same goes for the case of imaginative failure in §2.2 and the 
success conditions question. I’ll argue that existing answers to each question, both about perception 
and imagination, fail to explain what goes wrong in these cases. I’ll also gesture towards what these 
answers intuitively seem to leave out, i.e., what intuitively seems to be distinctive of actuality-oriented 
imagining that generates these cases of imaginative failure. In §4, I’ll ultimately return to these 
intuitions and aim to both vindicate them and make them more precise.  
2.1. On content determination 
 Here’s the first case of attempted actuality-oriented imagining in which a subject seems to mis-
imagine:  
WINDOWS: Peggy is a realtor with many houses currently on the market. One of these, a 
house called Alpha Manor, is a charming brick cottage in the countryside. Another, called Beta 
Estate, is a palatial, seaside mansion. She has seen both of these houses in person and in photos 
many times, so is well-acquainted with each. One day, she receives a call from a potential buyer 
for Alpha Manor. This caller is particularly concerned with whether the interior of the house 
receives a lot of natural light, so asks how many windows it has. Not having explicitly counted 
the number of windows before, and without any photos of the house nearby, Peggy pauses to 
form a visual image of Alpha Manor in order to count its windows. However, when she does 
so, she accidentally forms the image by drawing on her mental store of information about Beta 
Estate. The house in her mental image thus resembles Beta Estate and not Alpha Manor, 
though she takes her image to be of Alpha Manor. She counts the windows in her mental 
image and reports to the caller accordingly.  
Intuitively, it seems here that Peggy fails to imagine the object she intends to imagine: she tries, but 
fails, to imagine Alpha Manor. It’s not immediately obvious what object her imagining represents—if 
it represents Beta Estate while she mistakenly believes it represents Alpha Manor, or if it fails to 
represent any particular house. Regardless, what’s important here is the intuition that Peggy tries to 
imagine a particular, actual house, but fails to do so. The question I’m concerned with in this 
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subsection is: what is the necessary condition for content determination which Peggy fails to meet, 
such that she fails to represent Alpha Manor? 
 It’s relatively easy to see why we can’t just borrow the content determination conditions of 
perceptual experience to answer this question. Suppose I stand out on my street looking at my house. 
What makes it the case that my visual experience represents this house, rather than some other object? 
While the exact details of how to answer this question are controversial, it seems that they must 
somehow be grounded in the fact of my visual system’s occurrent perceptual relation to my house, a 
relation which requires an occurrent causal connection to an object in my perceptible environment. 
When I fail to represent some object in my environment, it’s in virtue of the fact that I’m not 
perceptually “hooked up” to it in the right way. Unlike perception, actuality-oriented imagining clearly 
doesn’t require this kind of occurrent perceptual connection, since Peggy can imagine Alpha Manor 
even when it’s nowhere in her immediate vicinity. So, we can’t appeal to the fact that Peggy doesn’t 
stand in an occurrent perceptual relation to Alpha Manor to explain why she fails to imagine it.  
 Might we instead adopt an answer from existing literature on the content determination of 
imaginings? I’ll now consider and reject what may be the most prominent such answer. One of the 
major contrasts between perception and imagination is that what we imagine is under our voluntary 
control to a degree that what we perceive isn’t.2 It might seem that this degree of control has 
implications for determining what a mental image represents—namely, because the content we 
imagine is up to us, what our imagery represents depends on what we intend to imagine and/or believe 
we are imagining. In this vein, views which I’ll call “subjectivist” hold that our intentions about what 
to imagine and/or our beliefs about what we are imagining are sufficient for determining the object(s) 
our mental imagery represents. This sort of view is quite common in literature on the imagination, 
though it’s stated in slightly different ways by different theorists (see, e.g., McGinn 2004, sec. 1.7; 
Dorsch 2012, ch. 3; Kung 2016, 626; Kind 2019, 166-67). I’ll focus on it as the very general claim that 
one’s beliefs and/or intentions about what one is imagining are sufficient for determining what one is 
imagining. 
 
2 This point has historically been emphasized by various philosophers, including Sartre and 
Wittgenstein (Balcerak Jackson 2018). There are, of course, ways in which we can control what we 
perceive (e.g., by controlling attention or where we direct our gaze), and we sometimes imagine things 
without explicitly choosing to (e.g., when our minds wander or we get some image stuck in our heads). 
Nevertheless, it seems intuitive that the content of our mental imagery is subject to our intentions 
about what to imagine in a way that perception isn’t. 
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 Reflection on examples initially shows why subjectivism is appealing. Consider the following 
passage from Tidman (1994), who borrows an example from Wittgenstein:  
…suppose someone claims to imagine King's College on fire. It would be absurd to ask, “Are 
you sure it’s King's College? Maybe you are just imagining a building that looks like King's 
College.” Whether one is imagining King's College depends not on the image, but on what we 
take the image to be an image of (301).  
Tidman thus argues that what an image represents depends on what the imaginer takes it to represent. 
In general, the fact that two phenomenally identical images can represent different objects depending 
on what the imaginer takes them to represent suggests that there’s a close link between an image’s 
content and the imaginer’s intentions and beliefs. A phenomenally identical mental image could 
represent either King’s College or a fictional building that looks like King’s College; a real house or a 
realistic fake house façade; and so on. Which object it really represents seems to depend on what I’m 
trying to imagine or believe myself to be imagining.  
 My aim here isn’t to contest the subjectivist treatment for cases of non-actuality-oriented 
imagining, or even to argue that intentions and beliefs don’t make any difference in actuality-oriented 
cases. However, WINDOWS shows that subjectivist conditions seem at least insufficient for 
determining what a mental image represents in actuality-oriented cases. Subjectivism about actuality-
oriented imagining would straightforwardly imply that Peggy does imagine Alpha Manor, because she 
intends to imagine Alpha Manor and believes she is doing so. This seems intuitively like the wrong 
description of WINDOWS. Subjectivism makes it very difficult for one to be wrong about what one 
is imagining, but this seems to be what happens to Peggy when she thinks she’s imagining Alpha 
Manor. Against the above quote from Tidman, it seems perfectly sensible, at least in an actuality-
oriented case like WINDOWS, to question whether Peggy really is imagining the object she thinks 
she’s imagining.  
Here’s my first gesture towards the condition for the content determination of actuality-
oriented imaginings that Peggy fails to meet: in actuality-oriented imagining cases, the stored 
information a subject draws on to form a mental image (at least partly) determines what that mental 
image represents. In other words, to imagine some object, it’s necessary to draw on information about 
what that object is like, rather than some distinct object. Peggy possesses information, acquired from 
past experiences, about both Alpha Manor and Beta Estate. However, when she goes to retrieve stored 
information about Alpha Manor in order to imagine it, she accidentally retrieves information about 
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Beta Estate, instead. That seems to be where she goes wrong in WINDOWS, and what makes it the 
case that she fails to imagine Alpha Manor.3 
This apparent need to possess stored information about some object in order to represent it 
seems to distinguish actuality-oriented imagining from perception and from other kinds of imagining. 
Because perceptually representing some object involves coming into a perceptual causal relation to it, 
we don’t necessarily need to possess any prior information about an object to perceive it. Instead, we 
can perceive novel objects by entering into that perceptual relation with them.4 And, when in a context 
of non-actuality-oriented imagining, it seems we can arbitrarily stipulate that our imaginings represent 
particular objects even if we don’t possess any individuating information about their properties. I may 
not have a clue what Socrates looked like, but that doesn’t stop me from imagining some arbitrary 
man and just stipulating that I’m imagining Socrates. I can also use imagination for purposes like 
designing a new fictional creature that I have never conceived of before, such as by mentally 
combining body parts of various kinds of animals in a new way. When doing so, I can form a mental 
image of this new creature and then, subsequently, name it, even if I had no previous idea what it 
would end up looking like. It may be that all sensory imaginings are constructed by drawing on stored 
information of some kind—perhaps information about men in general in the Socrates example and 
information about various kinds of animals in the fictional creature example. Nevertheless, such 
examples still differ from WINDOWS, where Peggy must draw on information about Alpha Manor 
in order to imaginatively represent it.5  
Again, this has been only a gesture towards what’s going wrong in WINDOWS, and part of 
my goal in §4 will be to precisify it.  
 
3 This suggests that there’s a close affinity between actuality-oriented imagining and memory. I explore 
this in more detail in §3.  
4 Readers already familiar with the predictive processing framework I’ll subscribe to below in §3 might 
object here that, according to that framework, constructing perceptual representations involves 
drawing on stored information we already possess about the world. However, while this framework 
may indeed require that I already have some general stored information about the world in order to 
perceptually represent some house, it doesn’t require that I already have information about that 
particular house for me to see it for the first time. I say more about these matters in §4. 
5 In this subsection, I haven’t totally ruled out that there exist non-actuality-oriented kinds of imagining 
to which this point about content determination also applies. There is such a huge range of types of 
imaginative acts—in modal epistemology, mindreading, fantasy, engagement with fiction, etc.—that I 
can’t rule this out here. However, even if it’s not unique to actuality-oriented imagining that 
representing an object requires drawing on stored information about it, this is at least a characteristic 
which sets it apart from many cases of imagining and from perception. 
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2.2. On Success Conditions  
Now turn to the success conditions question. I’ll start by considering another case of apparent 
mis-imagining, but where a subject seems intuitively not to meet actuality-oriented imagining’s success 
conditions:  
DRAPES: Ed purchases Alpha Manor and sets about doing some refurbishing on his new 
home. While visiting a home furnishing store, Ed decides on a whim to buy matching sets of 
new drapes for all of the house’s windows. He wonders to himself how many sets of drapes 
he needs to buy. Since he hasn’t counted Alpha Manor’s windows before and doesn’t have a 
photo with him, he pauses to try to form a mental image of Alpha Manor in order to count its 
windows. The house in his mental image resembles Alpha Manor closely, except that he 
mistakenly imagines it with an extra window—with eleven windows instead of its actual ten. 
He concludes that Alpha Manor has eleven windows, so buys one too many sets of drapes. 
Ed’s mis-imagining seems to be of a different kind than Peggy’s in WINDOWS. In that case, Peggy 
failed to imagine the object she intended to imagine. In DRAPES, it seems that Ed does imagine 
Alpha Manor, but nevertheless mis-imagines in virtue of getting the number of windows on Alpha 
Manor wrong. So, we can ask: what condition(s), for an actuality-oriented imagining to successfully 
represent an object, does Ed fail to meet? 
 Initially, the most obvious candidate is that Ed’s imagining is unsuccessful in virtue of failing 
to veridically represent Alpha Manor, given that he mis-imagines its number of windows. This would 
involve bringing the success conditions for actuality-oriented imagining in line with those for 
perception, where we typically take a successful representation to be one that veridically represents its 
objects. This might seem especially plausible given that actuality-oriented imagining is like perception 
in representing things in the actual world.  
The problem with this proposal is that full veridicality seems intuitively to be too demanding 
a standard. Consider a modified version of DRAPES in which Ed does imagine Alpha Manor with the 
right number of windows, and in which his mental image fairly closely resembles Alpha Manor overall. 
But, suppose that he nevertheless gets various other details wrong—say, the windows are the wrong 
shape and size, the doorknob is on the wrong side of the front door, and the colour of the house is 
too dark. Despite these inaccuracies, it doesn’t seem like his imagining is therefore unsuccessful. 
Rather, it seems like a general feature of actuality-oriented imagination that we usually, if not always, 
imagine with various inaccuracies of this kind. So, it doesn’t seem right to apply perception’s success 
conditions to actuality-oriented imagining.  
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Is there an existing alternative proposal about the success conditions of imagination that’s 
more promising? I think the most obvious place to look is existing literature on the function of 
imagination—specifically, to literature about the function of imagination in cases where it’s being used 
for epistemic purposes (rather than for, e.g., merely fantasizing or daydreaming). This is because we 
can determine a cognitive faculty’s success conditions by first determining its function. If, for example, 
we take perception’s cognitive function to involve tracking things as they actually are in the world 
around us, we can think of a given instance of perception as successful when it represents veridically 
(cf. Graham 2014). Similarly, recent work on how to distinguish successful cases of episodic 
remembering from cases of mis-remembering has focused on first understanding episodic memory’s 
function, then arguing that mis-rememberings are those which fail to fulfill this function (cf. de Brigard 
2014; Michaelian 2016a). In this spirit, it seems promising to look to existing philosophical views about 
the function of imagination to help answer the success conditions question.  
Unfortunately, though, prominent existing views about the function of imagination don’t seem 
applicable to cases of actuality-oriented imagining. It’s common to contrast imagining with perception 
by claiming imagination’s function is to cognize possibilities, rather than actuality. This tradition is 
grounded in influential work by, for example, Yablo (1993), who takes one of the primary epistemic 
values of the imagination to be delivering knowledge about what’s possible. In this vein, Williamson 
(2016) likens imagination to “attention to possibilities.” Similarly, Balcerak Jackson (2018) argues that 
the function of imagination is to recreate possible perceptual experiences, which grounds its ability to 
tell us about what’s metaphysically possible. If the function of imagination is to represent possibilities, 
then an imagining is successful when it represents a possible state of affairs. While this may indeed be 
true of many cases of imagining, it doesn’t intuitively capture the success conditions for an actuality-
oriented case like DRAPES. That’s because Ed’s mental image does reflect a possible way Alpha Manor 
could be: there are fairly nearby possible worlds in which Alpha Manor was built with eleven windows 
instead of ten, as well as worlds in which Ed does some home renovations to add an eleventh window. 
Nevertheless, his imagining seems unsuccessful. Although full veridicality seemed like too strict a 
standard, it seems like mere possibility is not strict enough—it’s relevant to the success of Ed’s 
imagining whether he imagines the house’s actual number of windows, even if he gets other details 
wrong.  
So, actuality-oriented imagining neither fits comfortably within perception’s success 
conditions nor within a prominent existing framework for thinking about the function of imagination. 
Rather, it seems that we instead need somehow to relativize our success conditions for Ed’s imagining 
9 
 
to the purpose or goal behind it. In other words, it seems that, to be successful, an actuality-oriented 
imagining need only veridically represent an object in respects relevant to the question(s) a subject is aiming to 
answer about that object. In DRAPES, Ed is wondering about the number of windows on Alpha 
Manor, so it’s relevant that he gets this property correct. This is a stricter success condition than for 
imaginings aimed at representing what’s merely possible, such as those used to investigate 
metaphysical possibility. It’s also a less strict success condition than for perception, where we expect 
a higher standard of veridicality.  
Much as in §2.1, that’s a somewhat vague, intuitive characterization of what makes actuality-
oriented imagining distinctive, relative to the success conditions question. §4 will aim to flesh this out 
more fully. First, though, §3 will elucidate the cognitive structure of actuality-oriented imagining in 
more detail. 
3. Actuality-oriented imagining: perceptual and active 
“Predictive processing” (hereafter “PP”) is one of the dominant frameworks for studying 
perception and action in recent cognitive science and philosophy of mind (for thorough overviews, 
see Hohwy 2013 and Clark 2016). In this section, I’ll draw on elements from this framework to 
elucidate the structure of actuality-oriented imagining cases.6 §3.1 first explains perception within PP, 
then extends these perceptual mechanisms to the construction of mental imagery. §3.2 then explains 
some key elements of the framework’s approach to action, especially certain kinds of mental action. 
Finally, §3.3 applies both perceptual and active aspects of PP to analyze cases of actuality-oriented 
imagining. First, though, a few general, preliminary points about the PP framework.  
The rest of this section will appeal to two, key notions at the core of PP. The first is the brain’s 
“generative model,” which constitutes its store of information about the world. This is usually framed 
in Bayesian terms, as a distribution of prior probabilities over hypotheses about states of the world. 
These include hypotheses of all sorts: where various objects and events in the world are located, what 
properties these objects have, the kinds of causal laws and regularities things in the world are, or tend 
to be, governed by, and so on. This model thus represents both the states of various parts of the world 
and information relevant for predicting how those states will evolve over time. It thereby structures 
 
6 Although the PP framework is—unsurprisingly—not uncontroversial, I won’t take up much space 
reviewing evidence and arguments in favour of it. I take it that the framework is popular and 
mainstream enough in the relevant sciences to justify using it as a starting point. I’m also appealing 
mainly to elements of the framework which are shared among various proponents of PP, rather than 
to any particular, idiosyncratic developments of the framework by specific theorists. 
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our perceptual systems’ expectations about what we’ll encounter as we observe and interact with the 
world, by constantly generating predictions about what the perceived world will be like. This model is 
then constantly revised and updated as we perceive the world and learn more about it.7 I’ll write in 
what follows as if the generative model’s hypotheses about the world are sub-personal states. It will 
thus sound as if states traditionally thought of as “cognitive”—in particular, person-level beliefs—are 
distinct from the cognitive architecture described by PP. However, I’m primarily doing this for 
simplicity. Many of PP’s strongest proponents (including Hohwy 2013 and Clark 2016) extend the 
framework to both personal and sub-personal processes. Even if they’re right about this, though, I 
think it’s plausible to nevertheless maintain that person-level states are importantly distinct from sub-
personal hypotheses, in a way that (at least roughly) tracks the more traditional distinction (for 
discussion, see Dewhurst 2017; Drayson 2017; Macpherson 2017). 
The second core notion is what PP sees as the brain’s main organizing principle: “prediction 
error minimization.” This essentially means that the brain is constantly trying to correct errors in its 
predictions about the world, i.e., to minimize discrepancies between the way the world is and the way 
its generative model says the world is. A more accurate model of the world, and of the way the states 
of the world will evolve over time, will result in more accurate predictions about what one will 
encounter as one goes about navigating the world. A less accurate model will result in discrepancies 
between what the brain expects and what it encounters. Intuitively, it makes sense that prediction 
error minimization would be (at least one of the) brain’s main evolved function(s), given that it’s 
conducive to an organism’s ability to satisfy basic needs like survival, finding nourishment, and 
reproducing. The more accurate one’s model and predictions, the less likely one is to encounter 
surprising, potentially dangerous or life-threatening situations for which one is unprepared. 
Furthermore, a more accurate model of the world means more accurate predictions about matters like 
where to find food, potential mates, and so on. And one’s ability to effectively act in the world, in 
ways conducive to one’s self-interest, is greatly enhanced by an ability to accurately predict the 
consequences of one’s actions. 
 
7 It’s also important for fully understanding the framework that this model is organized hierarchically: 
upper layers of this hierarchy contain hypotheses about more abstract properties over longer 
timescales (e.g., about ordinary objects and causal interactions between them), while lower layers 
contain less abstract properties over shorter timescales (e.g., about properties like colours, edges, and 
motion at short timescales). When the brain makes predictions about its environment, hypotheses at 
each layer of the hierarchy act as priors for the layer below. My arguments don’t depend directly on 
these facts about hierarchical organization, so I’ll gloss over this part of the framework in what follows.  
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3.1. Perception and imagery 
In what follows, I’ll mostly focus on vision, though the account is also meant to be adaptable 
to other perceptual modalities. 
It’s perhaps easiest to understand how PP views perception by contrasting it with more 
“traditional” scientific accounts of perception. On traditional accounts of vision, for example, 
perceptual experience is the result of the brain detecting information about the world that it receives 
in retinal input. We receive retinal stimulation from the external environment, from which the brain 
extracts information and assembles it into coherent perceptual representations. This is a “bottom-up” 
process because it involves passing information up from the world to the brain.  
In contrast, PP views visual experience as largely a product of “top-down” processing. Instead 
of the more passive process of receiving input and detecting features of the environment it conveys, 
perceptual processing is a more active, constructive process, in which the brain uses the information 
in its generative model to construct representations of one’s environment. As I navigate the world, 
my brain generates predictions about what I will encounter, based on the generative model’s set of 
most likely hypotheses about what’s in my perceptible environment. As this occurs, I still receive 
sensory data from the world in a bottom-up way, but the role of this data is to function as evidence 
against which the brain tests its top-down hypotheses. If the brain’s predictions are the hypotheses 
that best explain incoming sensory input, they’re deemed successful. If sensory evidence conflicts with 
the brain’s predictions, error signals are generated to indicate that these predictions must be revised; 
the brain then tries to revise its hypotheses to eliminate prediction error. So, visual processing is a 
process of the brain trying to minimize error in its perceptual predictions. A stable perceptual 
representation emerges when the brain has settled on the set of hypotheses that best minimizes 
prediction error. This framework thus differs from more traditional accounts of perception in that the 
construction of perceptual representations is driven by top-down predictions, although perceptual 
processing still involves the interaction of both top-down and bottom-up elements. 
As this process occurs, the brain’s generative model is also being updated, since the process 
of settling on the set of most likely hypotheses is also a process of revising the brain’s model of the 
world. The revised model then becomes the basis of subsequent predictions. The generative model is 
thus constantly collecting more and more information that’s used to inform future prediction and 
error minimization. When one sees some part of the world one has already perceived before, then, the 
brain’s initial predictions are drawn from information it already has about that part of the world—i.e., 
perceptual processing would begin by drawing on information the generative model already has about 
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the states of that part of the world, after which its predictions are confirmed against sensory evidence 
and revised as needed.  
That’s a basic sketch of perception within PP. Though it leaves much out, it’s sufficient for 
my purposes.8 I’ll turn now to mental imagery.   
 Some of PP’s proponents, including Clark (2016) and Kirchhoff (2018), have argued that the 
mechanisms involved in perception can be extended to explain the construction of mental imagery. 
It’s already widely thought that there is significant overlap between the cognitive mechanisms which 
produce perceptual experiences and mental imagery (cf. Clark 2016, ch. 3). Given that PP describes 
perceptual experience as constructed top-down, and given that mental imagery is also generated in a 
top-down, endogenous way, PP seems well-positioned to be extended to an account of imagery 
construction.  
 In PP, vision involves the brain using its store of existing information to generate perceptual 
predictions. These hypotheses are then confirmed against or revised on the basis of sensory input. But 
if the same kind of top-down image-construction process could also be implemented in a way that’s 
shielded from correction on the basis of bottom-up sensory evidence, we would have mechanisms 
that seem capable of constructing mental imagery. In other words, PP already says that the brain is 
capable of using its store of information about the world to endogenously generate perceptual 
representations. If that’s true, it’s plausible that mental imagery is generated by drawing on the same 
store of information, just in a way that’s (as Clark 2016 puts it) “insulated from” revision on the basis 
of sensory evidence. The result would be that the brain can generate imagery with a very similar 
phenomenology and representational format to perceptual experience—which sounds much like 
mental imagery. This is a process in which “imagining is essentially reusing some of the same prior 
probabilities that are generated, tuned and maintained by the agent when perceptually engaging with 
the world,” bringing back to mind predictions that had previously been revised during perception 
(Kirchhoff 2018, 765).9 
 
8 One important piece I left out is the role that “precision weighting” of bottom-up signals and top-
down hypotheses play in this picture; in particular, how this is thought to relate to perceptual attention. 
Without these pieces, the framework is significantly oversimplified—see Clark (2016, ch. 2) for much 
detailed discussion. 
9 One important question this line of thought raises is how to explain the differences in 
phenomenology between perception and imagination, particularly perception’s richness and 
phenomenal directness. Clark (2016, ch. 3) attempts to address this question. Although the connection 
between phenomenology and PP’s descriptions of the brain are important and interesting, I’m using 
PP here primarily as a computational framework for modelling perception and imagery, not as a 
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 I think that, more specifically, this kind of account at least seems well-positioned to describe 
mental imagery of the states of affairs one’s generative model says are most likely. In perceiving, my brain uses 
its model to bring to mind the most likely hypotheses about the part of the world I’m currently looking 
at, which are then confirmed and revised against sensory evidence. If we can generate mental imagery 
using the same top-down mechanisms involved in perception (minus revision against bottom-up 
signals), this would also involve bringing to mind the most likely hypotheses about whatever part of 
the world one is imagining. In other words, when I try to imagine some part of the actual world, my 
brain constructs a representation of what it expects I would see, were I actually perceiving that part of 
the world. When I’m imagining some part of the actual world which I’ve experienced before (and have 
no reason to think has changed), this would be a relatively simple process of bringing to mind 
information that was learned in past experience. Of course, we’re also able to imagine false and 
fantastical scenarios. Accounting for all kinds of mental imagery would require extending the PP 
framework to explain how we can bring to mind contents that go far beyond what the generative 
model says is most likely. But since my topic in this paper actuality-oriented imagining, this would go 
beyond my present needs.  
I’ll thus adopt this account of the construction of imagery representing parts of the actual 
world one has previously experienced (or, more precisely, of how my generative model takes the actual 
world to be). The key point here is that the construction of such imagery is far from a process of 
generating new information, as we might expect many uses of mental imagery to be. The imagination 
is often used more creatively, such as when we use it to combine our existing beliefs in novel ways (cf. 
Kind 2018) or to design novel fictional worlds. However, imagery of the actual world is formed just 
by bringing to mind the existing, rich sets of information we have collected during previous 
experiences, without transforming or altering that information. Such imagery is essentially a way of 
accessing the brain’s existing model of some part of the world, even when we’re not in current 
perceptual contact with that part.  
 I said above that PP sees the brain as fundamentally oriented towards prediction error 
minimization. So far, the account of how mental imagery is constructed doesn’t obviously imply 
anything about how imagining helps accomplish this—in fact, as it stands, it sounds more like 
imagining is inert in this sense, given that it’s just a matter of bringing back to mind previously updated 
hypotheses without revising them in response to sensory evidence. In §3.3, I’ll eventually get to 
 
framework for describing phenomenology. So, I’ll set aside these questions. For general discussion of 
the connection between PP and conscious phenomenology, see again Hohwy (2013).  
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explaining how actuality-oriented imagining is oriented towards prediction error minimization. First, 
though, I need to get some elements of PP’s account of action on the table.  
3.2. Action: physical and mental   
This subsection explains some components of the PP framework’s account of action, though 
it once again glosses over many of the fundamentals and fine details. I focus just on the points relevant 
for giving an account of actuality-oriented imagining in §3.3. For more detailed general explanations 
of action in the PP framework, see Clark (2016, esp. ch. 4).  
Suppose you’ve just moved to neighbourhood in walking distance from your office. You go 
to walk from your house to your office for the first time. As you do so, your brain’s generative model 
also continuously predicts the actions you’re performing, by predicting the states of your body in much 
the same way that it predicts other states of the world. Your brain would thus hypothesize that you’re 
currently walking to your office, as well as predict the various sub-actions and bodily movements 
which are constitutive of this. As long as you continue to perform the actions your generative model 
says you’re performing, there won’t be any discrepancies between what it says about the states of your 
body and what the incoming flow of sensory evidence says about the states of your body (sensory 
evidence coming from, e.g., proprioceptive signals). If you were to suddenly stop performing the 
action (because, e.g., you tripped and fell on the street), the incoming sensory evidence would reflect 
this, and your generative model’s hypotheses about what you’re now doing would be revised. Thus, 
minimization of perceptual prediction errors, regarding predictions about your own actions, is 
constantly occurring as you act.10  
 
10 PP actually says that the links between action, predictions about one’s actions, and prediction error 
minimization are much tighter than I’ve described here. PP doesn’t merely say that my brain attempts 
to minimize errors in predictions about my own actions; it makes the stronger claim that actions are a 
kind of prediction error minimization. Prior to performing an action, my generative model predicts 
that I’m now performing it, with a set of hypotheses about my bodily movements. When initially 
generated, that set of hypotheses is false—it conflicts with current sensory input, so results in 
prediction error. One way to eliminate this error is to revise the false hypotheses to say I’m not 
currently acting (the kind of process involved in perception—revising the brain’s hypotheses to 
accommodate sensory evidence). But another way is to act to make my brain’s hypotheses true—i.e., 
carry out the action my brain predicts I’m performing. This is known as “active inference,” and is the 
core of PP’s account of action. What I have said in this subsection is consistent with the full PP 
account, just weaker: I claimed that minimization of prediction error about my own actions occurs as 
I act, though I stopped short of saying that this is what action is. This is mainly because the full account 
introduces complexity that’s unnecessary for my arguments in the rest of the paper. 
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Now, suppose that, before you started your walk to the office, you consulted a map and tried 
to memorize the directions, but brought the map along just in case you needed to refresh your 
memory. Eventually, you get to an intersection and find that you can’t remember which way to turn 
next. In other words, although your current goal of walking to your office hasn’t changed, the 
appropriate sub-actions constitutive of achieving this goal have become unclear. Furthermore, as you 
suddenly stop walking because you become uncertain about what to do next, a mis-match arises 
between the action your generative model says you’re performing—walking to your office—and what 
current sensory input says you’re doing—standing still on the street corner. Due to this discrepancy, 
your brain encounters prediction error. 
The predictive brain is constantly attempting to minimize prediction error, so must now take 
some step to eliminate it. One option is just to abandon the action of walking to your office, while 
revising the prediction that you’re doing so to bring it in line with the fact that you’ve stopped walking. 
However, another option is to perform what’s called an “epistemic action” (Friston et al. 2015, 2016; 
Pezzulo and Nolfi 2019). Rather than directly contributing to achieving the goal one is currently 
carrying out, the function of an epistemic action is to reduce uncertainty about how to achieve that 
goal. In the present example, the most obvious such action would be pulling out and consulting your 
map. An epistemic action allows one to, subsequently, continue acting in accordance with one’s 
current hypotheses about how one is acting. It’s thus another way to eliminate the prediction error 
arising from discrepancies between one’s hypotheses and current bodily sensory evidence, one that 
doesn’t require giving up one’s current goals.  
 Pulling out and reading a map is a physical epistemic action—it involves using your body to act 
on the world to collect information. We can also conceptualize certain mental actions on a similar 
model (Pezzulo et al. 2016; Pezzulo 2017; Metzinger 2017). There’s a very wide range of kinds of 
mental actions that could be included in this category; I’ll be very general here, while the next 
subsection focuses more narrowly on how actuality-oriented imagining fits in. (For discussion of 
unifying various kinds of mental epistemic actions, see especially Metzinger 2017.) Consider a similar 
example of walking to your office and arriving at a point where you don’t have the next set of 
directions memorized, but this time where you’ve forgotten to bring your map along. You could 
perform a physical epistemic action, such as going back home to retrieve your map or asking someone 
on the street for directions. But another option is to engage in some kind of mental action, such as 
some kind of reasoning or recalling information. You might, for example recall the fact that your 
office is to the south-east of your home and reason from there about which direction to go. Like 
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physical epistemic actions, mental epistemic actions function to reduce uncertainty about what to do 
next, thereby allowing one to eliminate prediction error by continuing to act.   
 For my purposes in what follows, the key point in this subsection is this role that mental 
epistemic actions play in achieving the brain’s core function of prediction error minimization. 
Discrepancies between what my brain predicts about my own actions and what I’m actually doing 
generate prediction error; this error can often be eliminated by performing an epistemic action that 
reduces my uncertainty about how to act, and such actions are often mental.  
The next subsection turns to applying features from this subsection and §3.1 to explain 
actuality-oriented imagining. 
3.3. Actuality-oriented imagining   
 Actuality-oriented imagining has both perceptual and active characteristics. It has a perceptual 
phenomenal character and representational format, and, like perception, represents actuality. At the 
same time, it’s also a mental action which is undertaken intentionally and directed by a subject’s current 
goals. We can describe the overall structure of actuality-oriented imagining cases by drawing on both 
perceptual and active aspects of the PP framework. I’ll first do this in detail using the example of 
Peggy’s imagining in WINDOWS, then extend the account to Ed’s imagining in DRAPES. 
 First, we can apply the PP framework for action to describe the overall context in which an 
actuality-oriented imagining occurs, as well as the function it plays in that context. Take WINDOWS, 
in which Peggy is speaking to a potential buyer for Alpha Manor on the phone, answering her various 
questions. Peggy’s generative model will predict her own actions accordingly: that she’s speaking to 
the caller and answering her questions about Alpha Manor, along with the various actions which are 
constitutive of doing so (e.g., making particular vocalizations into the phone). Eventually, the caller 
asks Peggy how many windows are on Alpha Manor. As with every previous question, Peggy’s 
generative model predicts that she answers this question.11 However, doing so requires that Peggy 
have an explicit belief about the number of windows, so that she can communicate this information 
to the person on the phone. As per the case, though, Peggy has never formed an explicit belief about 
this.  
 
11 Note that, generally, both parties to a conversation have an overarching expectation that questions 
will be answered appropriately, except in rare cases where, e.g., a question has a false presupposition 
that the respondent must correct (cf. Stivers 2010). So, it makes sense to think that, by default, Peggy 
will expect herself to answer this rather straightforward question from the caller, unless it turns out 
that for some reason she’s unable to do so and must therefore revise this initial expectation.  
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Peggy therefore runs into a situation of uncertainty about how to act, so pauses. This pause 
generates prediction error, due to a discrepancy between the hypothesis that she’s answering the 
caller’s question and sensory evidence that she isn’t doing so. One option to eliminate this prediction 
error is, of course, to revise the prediction that she’s answering the caller’s question and just not do 
so. What Peggy ends up doing instead is turning to an epistemic action to resolve her uncertainty. 
Peggy isn’t in a position where she can easily perform a physical epistemic action, such as looking at 
Alpha Manor itself or pulling out a picture of it. She instead performs a mental epistemic action—
namely, imagining Alpha Manor and counting the number of windows in it.  
 §3.1’s PP model of mental imagery explains how this mental epistemic action is carried out. 
Peggy attempts to bring to mind a mental image of Alpha Manor; specifically, she tries to retrieve the 
set of most likely hypotheses about Alpha Manor, as encoded in her generative model during prior 
experiences of the house. Given the context of Peggy’s imagining, it’s important that she’s aiming to 
bring to mind the hypotheses her generative model says are most likely, rather than altering this 
information in any way. By doing this, Peggy can, instead of physically going to look at Alpha Manor, 
bring to mind her brain’s expectations about what she would see, were she to actually go look at it. 
These are the same hypotheses her brain would initially draw on to construct her perceptual 
experience, were she observing Alpha Manor directly—though in a perceptual case these hypotheses 
would, additionally, be confirmed and revised against sensory evidence, which they aren’t in a case of 
imagining. (Of course, Peggy ends up accidentally drawing on the wrong set of hypotheses, hypotheses 
about Beta Estate; what I have described here is the cognitive process she tries, but fails, to perform.) 
Once Peggy has formed her mental image and counted the number of windows, she will have 
eliminated her uncertainty in how to continue conversing with the caller, allowing her to assert her 
explicit belief about Alpha Manor’s windows. In doing so, she eliminates the prediction error that was 
initially generated when her generative model said she was responding to the caller but she was not in 
fact doing so.  
We can see now that both the active and perceptual nature of actuality-oriented imagining are 
important for understanding Peggy’s imagining. Fully understanding her imagining’s function requires 
taking into account the broader context in which it’s performed. Peggy is trying to carry out a particular 
action—making an assertion on the phone—and faces uncertainty about how to do so. This generates 
prediction error with respect to her brain’s hypotheses about her current actions. Her imagining is a 
mental epistemic action which functions to reduce her uncertainty and therefore to eliminate 
prediction error. Fully understanding how she carries out this mental epistemic action requires 
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understanding the mechanisms involved in constructing an actuality-oriented image of Alpha 
Manor—namely, that this is a matter of retrieving a set of information her generative model has 
collected from prior experiences, in the form of its most likely hypotheses about Alpha Manor. 
 Now that we have this story about WINDOWS, we can easily tell the same kind of story about 
DRAPES. In that case, Ed is also in a context of acting: he’s at the store carrying out his goal of buying 
a set of drapes for each of Alpha Manor’s windows. However, he faces uncertainty about how to 
achieve this goal, because he doesn’t have an explicit belief about how many windows Alpha Manor 
has. So, in order to avoid a discrepancy between what his generative model says about how he’s 
currently acting and what his body is actually doing, he must either abandon his goal of buying the 
drapes or perform some kind of epistemic action to alleviate his uncertainty. Rather than performing 
a physical epistemic action, such as returning to Alpha Manor and counting its windows, he performs 
a mental epistemic action, imagining Alpha Manor. The mental epistemic action he tries to perform is 
basically the same one as Peggy: bringing to mind the most likely set of hypotheses about Alpha 
Manor, given his prior experiences of it (though, of course, he ends up mis-imagining, but in a different 
way from Peggy). 
 The account I just developed describes actuality-oriented imagining as retrieving an existing 
set of information about the world. This naturally raises the question of whether actuality-oriented 
imagining is a kind of remembering, or exactly how it’s related to memory. An overarching goal of this 
paper is to carve off actuality-oriented imagining as a distinctive cognitive capacity; however, if 
actuality-oriented imagination is really just a kind of memory, this might seem to confound this goal, 
by implying that our focus should be on studying memory rather than actuality-oriented imagining in 
isolation. I’ll address this concern in the remainder of this subsection.  
 Perhaps the most obvious place to look when considering this question is episodic memory, 
which involves using mental imagery to recall events which we previously experienced—as when, for 
example, I remember my tenth birthday party or yesterday’s lunch.12 Actuality-oriented imagining has 
a lot in common with episodic memory, given its sensory representational format and the fact that it 
involves bringing to mind imagery of previously experienced objects. Nevertheless, there are some 
key differences between them. To see these, it’s helpful to invoke what Robins (2020) calls the target 
 
12 The term “episodic memory” was introduced in psychology by Tulving (1972) as distinct from 
semantic memory, which I discuss below. The study of episodic memory has recently been taken up by 
many philosophers of mind (e.g., De Brigard 2014; Michaelian 2016a).  
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content of episodic memories.13 In line with typical definitions of episodic memory in philosophy and 
psychology, Robins argues that it’s necessary for a mental state to be an instance of episodic 
remembering that one targets or aims to represent a specific type of content: particular events from 
one’s personal past, i.e., events one personally experienced in the past.  
With this in mind, we can see that the target content of actuality-oriented imagining contrasts 
with episodic memory in two important ways. First, while episodic memory targets the past, actuality-
oriented imagining targets the present. In both WINDOWS and DRAPES, for example, the subjects 
are aiming to imagine Alpha Manor as it is now: they don’t currently care how many windows it had 
during some past event, but how many windows it has now. Second, while episodic memory by 
definition involves recreating the contents of a prior experience, this isn’t true for actuality-oriented 
imagining: the subjects in our cases might be visualizing Alpha Manor in ways that don’t reflect 
particular past experiences. We can starkly illustrate this difference by considering circumstances under 
which it would be more efficient to use actuality-oriented imagining than episodic memory to answer 
the question of how many windows Alpha Manor has. Suppose that Peggy has retained four episodic 
memories of particular past visits to the house: one in which she’s driving past the house and seeing 
it from the front; one in which she’s in the back yard, taking pictures of the back of the house; one in 
which she’s walking from one side of the house around to the back, while speaking with a potential 
buyer; and one in which she’s walking from the back, around the other side, to the front. It would be 
possible for Peggy to answer the question of how many windows are on Alpha Manor by “flipping 
through” these various episodic memories of specific past visits, since together they include all sides 
of the house. However, given that the contents of these memories overlap with one another and that 
they involve irrelevant details (e.g., pulling out her camera to snap photos; speaking with the potential 
buyer), it would be much more efficient to imagine a single, sequential “tour” of the outside of the 
house, even if she’s never experienced the house this way in real life.  
 So, actuality-oriented imagination lacks some properties which are fundamental to episodic 
memory.14 However, episodic memory isn’t the only kind of memory that involves the retrieval of 
 
13 Robins notes that she develops the idea of target content from Cummins (1996), but that her 
application to episodic memory is original.  
14 I don’t mean to take a stance on whether episodic memory and actuality-oriented imagining are 
continuous in the sense of Perrin (2016) and Michaelian (2016b)—i.e., whether, besides their distinct 
types of contents, the two are in some sense the same kind of cognitive process. Some recent work in 
this area has argued that episodic remembering is continuous in this sense with various kinds of 
imagery-construction processes, including imagining the future, imagining counterfactuals, and 
imagining atemporal scenes (Maguire and Mullally 2013; De Brigard and Gessell 2016; Sant’anna and 
20 
 
stored information—semantic memory also does this. Semantic memory is our capacity to store and 
retrieve facts and conceptual knowledge in ways not tied to representations of particular events from 
the personal past. This category is quite diverse. It paradigmatically includes beliefs we have stored in 
an explicit, linguistic format, such as when retrieving the stored knowledge that Ottawa is the capital 
of Canada or that Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon. It’s also often taken to include conceptual 
knowledge that we retrieve using mental imagery (cf. Binder and Desai 2011; Yee et al. 2018), such as 
when one visualizes a prototypical donkey to bring to mind the proposition that donkeys have manes 
or visualizes the Italian flag to bring to mind information about which colours are on it. This sort of 
information is also typically thought to be operative when we deploy stored conceptual knowledge in 
object recognition. (The role for semantic memory in perception may be even greater in the PP 
framework I’ve adopted in this paper, given the way PP says top-down stored information heavily 
permeates perceptual processing.) 
 If all of the above sorts of processes are included in the category of semantic remembering, it 
seems like actuality-oriented imagining should be, too: if using mental imagery to retrieve general facts 
is a form of semantic memory, and if perceptually processing particular parts of the world involves 
drawing on semantic memory, then using mental imagery to retrieve facts about particular parts of the 
world also sounds like a form of semantic memory. In our WINDOWS and DRAPES cases, this 
would mean using mental imagery to bring to mind the fact that Alpha Manor has ten windows.  
Notice, though, that this makes semantic memory quite a heterogeneous category, especially 
when we also throw in all the various kinds of non-sensory, linguistic representations we possess 
(explicit stored knowledge of general facts, of facts about particular parts of the world, of abstract 
mathematical facts, etc.). Semantic memory thus ends up including any kind of information storage 
and retrieval that isn’t episodic, unlike episodic memory which is quite narrowly defined in terms of a 
specific type of target content.15 This heterogeneity warrants individualized study of the various 
capacities grouped under the category of semantic memory, in addition to studying the category as a 
 
Michaelian 2019). If this is right, it could plausibly be extended to actuality-oriented imagining, too. 
Even so, continuists don’t tend to deny that, in virtue of their distinct types of content, we can 
meaningfully refer to memory and imagination as separate capacities (Michaelian 2016a, for example, 
refers to episodic memory as a natural kind, despite also thinking it’s continuous with future-
imagining).  
15 Besides semantic and episodic memory, there’s also nondeclarative memory, which includes skills, 
habits, and classical conditioning. However, as Michaelian (2016a, sec. 2.6) argues, nondeclarative 




whole. This is in line with existing practices among philosophers and psychologists: although we 
sometimes study information storage and retrieval at a very general level, we also, for example, study 
our capacities for object recognition and mathematical learning in isolation from one another. 
Plausibly, the same should go for actuality-oriented imagination, especially since, as I have already 
argued and will continue to argue below, it’s distinct in various ways from other, similar cognitive 
capacities.  
So, although it may be right to include actuality-oriented imagination alongside various other 
capacities classified as semantic memory, this doesn’t mean that it’s not a distinctive cognitive capacity 
which warrants individualized study.  
4. Back to content determination and success conditions  
 I’ll now leverage the previous section’s account of actuality-oriented imagining to fill out 
answers to the content determination and success conditions questions. Specifically, I’ll aim to both 
vindicate and make more precise the intuitions I discussed in §2. There, I argued that something like 
the following two conditions seem to distinguish actuality-oriented imagining from perception and 
other kinds of imagining:  
(1) On content determination: imagining some object requires drawing on stored information 
about that object to form one’s mental image.  
(2) On success conditions: to be successful, an actuality-oriented imagining need only 
veridically represent its object in respects relevant to the question(s) a subject aims to 
answer.  
I’ll take each of these points in turn.  
 To see why something like (1) falls out of §3’s PP-based account, we have to consider the 
overall cognitive process which that account says is involved in forming an actuality-oriented mental 
image. Actuality-oriented imagining is a mental epistemic action meant to reduce uncertainty about 
achieving one’s current goals, in cases where this requires one to form a belief about the actual world. 
Given this, it involves a subject trying to bring to mind true information about the world. 
Consideration of the perceptual mechanisms involved in actuality-oriented imagining tells us more 
specifically how a subject goes about trying to do this—namely, by trying to bring to mind the set of 
perceptual hypotheses, about the object she’s imagining, which her brain’s generative model says are 
most likely. So, rather than trying to form a relevant belief by somehow discovering new information 
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about the world, a subject is using the imagination as a means of trying to bring to mind an existing set 
of information.  
 This account verifies the intuition that Peggy fails to imagine Alpha Manor in WINDOWS. 
Peggy is trying to bring to mind the set of most likely hypotheses about Alpha Manor, but what she 
actually ends up doing is bringing to mind a set of hypotheses about Beta Estate. It’s not that she 
brings to mind some false information about Alpha Manor, or that she doesn’t possess any stored 
information about what Alpha Manor looks like so has to make a best guess. Rather, she retrieves the 
wrong information altogether, information about a totally different object. This means that Peggy fails 
altogether to carry out the cognitive process constitutive of actuality-oriented imagining Alpha Manor. 
In other words, if trying to imagine Alpha Manor in an actuality-oriented case is equivalent to trying 
to bring to mind hypotheses about Alpha Manor, then Peggy altogether fails to imagine Alpha Manor 
when she brings to mind hypotheses about Beta Estate.  
This account thus both vindicates and makes more precise intuition (1). The intuition is correct 
because imagining some object in an actuality-oriented case involves trying to retrieve stored 
information about that object; one must actually retrieve such information if one is to carry out the 
process one is trying to implement, and one fails altogether to do so when one brings to mind 
information about a totally different object. And we can make this point more precise by explaining 
what it means to imaginatively bring to mind stored information in such cases: the cognitive process 
involved is one of trying to bring to mind the set of perceptual hypotheses about an imagined object 
that the brain’s generative model says are most likely.  
There’s a sense in which what I just argued seems to merely pass the buck. We were asking 
how an actuality-oriented mental image gets to be about some object, and my response referred us to 
facts concerning what the stored information used to construct an image is about. The obvious 
question this raises is how that stored information itself comes to be about the object. However, this 
is a large, general question about the semantics of stored mental content, one that’s distinct from my 
focus on the nature of actuality-oriented imagining. The question I addressed in this section is: what 
kind of process is one trying to implement when trying to actuality-oriented imagine some object, such 
that carrying out this process is necessary for bringing to mind a mental image of that object? My 
response is: because actuality-oriented imagining is a process aimed at bringing to mind stored 
information about a particular object, one fails to imagine that object when one draws on stored 
information about a different object. A distinct question asks how that stored information’s content 
was originally determined, prior to the time that it goes on to determine the content of a conscious 
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mental image; plausibly, these questions can be kept apart. Robins (2016) makes a similar point in her 
discussion of episodic memory. She argues that the question of how memory traces (i.e., episodic 
representations which are stored in memory and apt to be activated to cause episodes of episodic 
remembering) are stored in relation to one another and activated to produce conscious mental imagery 
is distinct from the question of how those stored traces themselves get their contents. The former 
question is analogous to my concerns in this paper and is relevant to determining what a conscious 
mental image, which is constructed by drawing on stored information, represents; the latter is a much 
larger issue about how stored mental representations acquire their content.  
Given my adoption of the PP framework in this paper, though, I can at least make this 
question more precise and gesture at a possible answer. Given how PP conceptualizes all stored 
information about the world as a generative model consisting in probability distributions over 
hypotheses about the states of the world, the relevant, more precise question here is: how does such 
a generative model come to represent the world? Recent work in the PP framework has argued that 
the generative model represents by resembling the causal-probabilistic structure and dynamics of the 
world (Gładziejewski 2016; Wiese 2017; Williams 2018). I think this answer may need to be 
supplemented by appealing to a causal condition as well, given that the generative model acquires its 
resemblance to the world via perceptual causal connections that allow it to learn the world’s structure 
and dynamics (i.e., it’s not mere resemblance that grounds representation, but resemblance acquired via 
appropriate causal connection to the world). In any case, since this is a very large topic which has been 
considered by others in much detail, I’ll now set it aside.  
 Returning to our consideration of (1): I said in §2.1 that (1) doesn’t seem to apply to 
perception, nor to other kinds of imagining. The present framework helps to explain this, too.  
Although in PP perceptual experience also involves drawing on the brain’s best hypotheses 
about the external world, perception is a process in which these hypotheses are also confirmed by, or 
revised against, sensory evidence. In a case where one perceives some part of the world one is already 
familiar with, it’s likely that information one already possesses about that part of the world will feature 
in the construction of one’s experience, as it does in actuality-oriented imagining. However, it’s not 
necessary, to perceive some object, that one possesses previously stored information about it. One can 
perceive novel objects by updating one’s current perceptual hypotheses based on sensory evidence 
that one is perceiving something novel. In other words, it can be the case that, in the very process of 
acquiring information about an object for the first time, one comes to perceive that object.  
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 As I said in §3.1, it’s not immediately obvious how to explain, within the PP framework, the 
computations involved in non-actuality-oriented imaginings to which (1) does not seem intuitively to 
apply. However, whatever account we end up giving, it seems clear that those sorts of imagining will 
involve a process that’s different from what PP says about actuality-oriented imagining. As per my 
discussion in §2.1, it’s plausible that my mental image can represent Socrates when I imagine an 
arbitrary man and stipulate that I’m imagining Socrates. In that case, it’s clearly not true that I need to 
bring to mind hypotheses made most likely by my previous experiences of Socrates in order to imagine 
him, because I don’t have any such stored information. This suggests that, whatever exactly the 
imagery-construction process involves in this kind of case, it will be a different kind of cognitive 
process than the one involved in actuality-oriented imagining. So, if there’s any sense in which it’s 
possible to try, and fail, to imagine Socrates in this kind of case (although such failure may not even 
be possible—cf. Dorsch 2012, ch. 3), it will be a different kind of failure from Peggy’s failure when 
she tries, and fails, to imagine Alpha Manor. If I don’t need to possess any prior information about 
Socrates to imagine him in this stipulative way, then I can’t fail to imagine him by failing to draw on 
the right information.  
 Turn now to (2). We can break this intuition down into two sub-intuitions. First, to be 
successful, an actuality-oriented imagining must veridically represent the properties of an object which 
are relevant to answering the question(s) a subject is aiming to answer. Second, to be successful, an 
actuality-oriented imagining need not veridically represent the properties of an object which aren’t 
relevant to a subject’s question(s). We can vindicate and precisify both of these sub-intuitions by again 
appealing to §3’s account of actuality-oriented imagining.  
 As per §2.2, we can derive a mental capacity’s success conditions from the conditions under 
which it fulfills its cognitive function. According to §3’s account, the function of an actuality-oriented 
imagining is to reduce uncertainty about how to continue acting, thus eliminating prediction error 
arising from the fact that, while one’s generative model says that one is acting, one’s actions have 
halted in the face of uncertainty. For Ed in DRAPES, for example, this means reducing his uncertainty 
about how to continue buying new drapes for Alpha Manor’s windows.  
Now, at the time of this case, it will seem to Ed that his imagining has fulfilled this function, 
since it removes his feelings of uncertainty. When he imagines Alpha Manor with the wrong number 
of windows, he won’t immediately be aware of any discrepancies between how he takes the world to 
be and how the world really is, because he will continue to act in a way that seems to conform to what 
his generative model says he’s doing—i.e., buying drapes for each of Alpha Manor’s windows. 
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However, it’s important that the predictive brain aims not just at minimizing apparent discrepancies, in 
the short term, between its model and the world; rather, its aim is to minimize actual discrepancies. 
That’s because merely doing the former isn’t conducive to minimizing overall prediction error in the 
long run—the more actual differences there are between how I think the world is and how the world 
actually is, the more likely it is that I’ll falsely predict the states of my environment at some point, and 
therefore encounter an unexpected or surprising situation. We can see this clearly in DRAPES. At the 
time of the case, Ed’s generative model says that he’s buying new drapes for each of Alpha Manor’s 
windows, and it seems that he’s successfully doing so. What he’s really doing, though, is buying one 
too many sets of drapes. This discrepancy will result in prediction error in the near future. When Ed 
is about to arrive home, he will predict that he has exactly one set of drapes for each window, that 
he’ll go on to install those drapes accordingly, and so on. Once he arrives home, it will become 
apparent that many of his expectations are false, generating prediction error.   
So, the function of Ed’s imagining is to reduce his uncertainty in a way that contributes to 
successfully continuing to carry out his goal of buying drapes for each window. This function sets his 
imagining’s success conditions. Ed’s mental image of Alpha Manor must have the correct number of 
windows to be successful; too many or too few will result in a discrepancy between the predictions of 
Ed’s generative model and how the world actually is. At the same time, it also wouldn’t prevent Ed’s 
imagining from fulfilling its function if he inaccurately imagines other properties of Alpha Manor. 
Those other properties aren’t currently relevant to minimizing prediction error, since he isn’t basing 
new beliefs on them or acting on the basis of them. Once he forms his belief about the number of 
windows, his mental image, with whatever other inaccuracies it contains, serves no further purpose.  
So, the PP-based account of actuality-oriented imagining helps us vindicate (2): this account 
implies that only the properties of a mental image relevant to the brain’s core function of prediction 
error minimization must be veridical, and these properties line up with our original intuitions about 
which properties must be veridical. We can also appeal further to what this account says about 
actuality-oriented imagining’s perceptual aspects to make this intuition more precise. An actuality-
oriented mental image is constructed from the set of perceptual hypotheses one’s generative model 
says are most likely. We can unpack (2) in terms of which perceptual hypotheses used to generate a 
mental image must be true in order for the imagining to be successful—i.e., for the imagining to be 
conducive to successful prediction error minimization. To be successful, an actuality-oriented 
imagining need not be constructed from a set of hypotheses which are all true; rather, only the subset 
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of hypotheses which are relevant to prediction error minimization need be true, while those which 
aren’t relevant to this function need not be.16 
The PP framework also helps us see why this is a fact that’s distinctive of actuality-oriented 
imagining, in comparison with perception and other kinds of imagining.  
It might seem at first that the arguments I just gave about actuality-oriented imagining extend 
to the success conditions of perceptual experience, in that only the elements of a perceptual experience 
upon which we’re currently basing explicit beliefs need to be accurate for an experience to count as 
successful. However, the PP framework for perception actually predicts the opposite of this. On the 
PP account, all aspects of perceptual representations are produced in a process of the brain trying to 
minimize prediction error, by confirming its perceptual hypotheses against sensory inputs. This 
process aims to eliminate discrepancies between my brain’s current predictions and the way the world 
is, using sensory evidence to try to correct such discrepancies. So, any perceptual experience that mis-
represents the world is one that has failed to reduce discrepancies between the brain’s hypotheses and 
what’s true.17 Contrast this with actuality-oriented imagining cases, where a subject is retrieving 
information about the world in a process where this information is not automatically tested against 
sensory input. Here, if some details of the resulting mental image are inaccurate, it won’t be as a result 
of that subject failing to properly revise some hypothesis against sensory input, since that’s not the 
kind of process she’s implementing when she imagines. The inaccuracies in her mental image may be 
grounded in some inaccuracies in the stored information she’s drawing on, which could have gotten 
there either during or after the process of originally acquiring this information during past perceptual 
experience. But that just means there’s a deficiency in one’s stored information about the world, not 
a deficiency with respect to whether the mental image fulfills its function. 
 
16 At the end of §3, I distinguished actuality-oriented imagining from episodic memory based on their 
respective target contents. On some views of memory, my arguments in this section about success 
conditions also constitute a difference. Robins (2020), for example, takes any deviation from a 
remembered experience’s contents to be memory errors, a stricter condition than what I just defended 
for actuality-oriented imagining (and one which seems to fit with our intuitive conception of episodic 
memory’s success conditions). However, this view isn’t shared by all—De Brigard (2014) and 
Michaelian (2016a), for example, deny it. 
17 This is an oversimplification, in that—as I mentioned above in fn. 9—it glosses over the role of 
precision weighting and attention. In brief: the brain may settle into less precise interpretations of 
parts of the world to which we’re not perceptually attending; in those cases, our experience may not 
precisely or fully determinately represent what’s in our perceptible environment. In such cases, the 
brain also won’t revise its model of some imprecisely-represented part of the world to be more precise 
than its perceptual representation was.  
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The same success conditions also wouldn’t apply to other cases of imagining. Often, we don’t 
base new beliefs about the world on our imaginings, such as when merely fantasizing; in such cases, 
one can’t be susceptible to the kind of failure that Ed is.18 What about imaginings on which we base 
beliefs about what’s possible? Beliefs about possibility and/or impossibility can be true or false, and 
also may help to shape our future predictions about the world. They may do this by, for example, 
helping to narrow the space of hypotheses the brain takes into account when deciding which is most 
likely. So, such beliefs, if false, plausibly could negatively impact long-run prediction error 
minimization, meaning that so can the imaginings we use to form such beliefs. Nevertheless, if the 
function of such imaginings is to tell us about which hypotheses are possible, achieving this function 
doesn’t require veridically representing the object one imagines in any particular respects. Rather, it 
just requires accurately representing what’s possible. So, relative to this function, we would expect 
success conditions which are distinct from those for actuality-oriented imagining, whose function 
requires veridically representing an object in some relevant respect(s).   
5. Conclusion  
 Far from being relegated to representing only the non-actual, the imagination is a cognitive 
faculty which can be used to put us in touch with the way things are in reality. It does so when we 
engage in actuality-oriented imagining, the capacity I have tried, in this paper, to carve off as distinctive 
in both its metaphysics of representation and the success conditions governing it. Its distinctiveness 
is grounded in the fact that it has characteristics which are both perceptual and active, aspects which 
this paper attempted to unify into a single account. 
In conclusion, I’ll sketch two implications, of what I have argued in this paper, for the 
philosophy of imagination more generally.  
 Firstly, my arguments that actuality-oriented imagining is importantly distinct from perception 
and other kinds of imagining has implications for how we conceptualize the different “sub-categories” 
of imagination. As is often noted, there’s a huge range of domains in which we employ what seem 
aptly described as “imaginative” capacities. Many of these have generated their own, focused research 
programs: there are large literatures on the use of imagination in modal epistemology (e.g., Yablo 
 
18 It’s a tricky question how to fit phenomena like fantasy and fictional engagement into the PP 
framework, since it’s not clear exactly how they’re relevant to minimizing prediction error. However, 
this problem generalizes to other accounts of cognition besides PP—it’s just generally difficult to 
figure out why we have the capacity to fantasize and think about fictional worlds, given that it’s a 
tough question exactly what evolutionary advantage this confers. 
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1993), mindreading (e.g., Goldman 2006), and engagement with fiction (e.g., Walton 1990), to name 
only a few. The arguments of this paper suggest that actuality-oriented imagining deserves a place 
alongside these other uses of imagination, as its own sub-category. This is especially true given that 
getting a grip on all the diverse ways we use the imagination seems like an important part of evaluating 
the prospects of systematizing these into some kind of unified framework (for further discussion of 
such prospects, see Dorsch 2012; Kind 2013; Abraham 2016).   
 Secondly, getting clear on the nature of actuality-oriented imagining, as I unpacked it in this 
paper, has implications for how we conceptualize the question at the heart of the epistemology of 
imagination. Some recent philosophy takes it that the imagination is by default a faculty unconstrained 
from reality, with an important philosophical puzzle being how we’re sometimes able to “reign in” 
this faculty for epistemic purposes, such as thinking about what’s possible (cf. Kind and Kung 2016). 
However, many cases of actuality-oriented imagining seem, on reflection, to be rather mundane yet 
epistemically significant—it’s quite natural and effortless to use mental imagery as a means of forming 
a belief about the number of windows on one’s house, for example. Furthermore, such uses of the 
imagination are, as I remarked in §3.1, rather computationally simple: they involve bringing to mind 
existing stored information about the world without transforming or re-combining it in any way. And 
they’re implemented using perceptual cognitive mechanisms which—assuming the PP framework is 
on the right track—are generally in the business of drawing on existing information about the world 
to construct representations of actuality. In light of all this, the real puzzle seems not to be how we 
can use such a reality-transcendent faculty for epistemically useful purposes. Instead, the more 
puzzling question seems to be how cognitive mechanisms so suited to representing actuality are also 
able to so easily transcend it. Rather than taking reality-transcendent uses of imagination as basic and 
asking how it’s possible to bring the imagination in line with reality, it may be more fruitful to start 
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